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# Combat Power Analysis Is Combat Power Density Defense

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Generation of Combat Power by Insurgents

*Combat Power Analysis  
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## **CLINTON VILLEGAS**

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Information--the Fifth Element of Combat Power Naval Institute Press

Using a case study based on the Army's new Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the authors explore how the Army might improve its ability to contribute to prompt, global power projection, that is, strategically responsive early-entry forces for time-critical events. The authors examine options to reach a dual goal: to initiate deployment of the right force capabilities, and then get those capabilities where they need to be as quickly as possible.

**Project Air Force Assessment of Operation Desert Shield** RAND Corporation

The U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) is the largest single provider of research, technology development, engineering, and systems analysis for the Army. Under the command and leadership of AMC, and in support of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)), RDECOM executes the mission to empower, unburden, protect, and sustain the Soldier through integrated research, development, and engineering solutions. Aligned with the AMC Strategic

Plan 2013-2023, RDECOM is responsible for all materiel- related technology and engineering in support of generating Army Land Combat Power. RDECOM provides technology integration across all aspects of Land Combat Power development; provides unbiased technical advice and expertise to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Program Executive Officers/Program Managers (PEOs/PMs), and industry; and collaborates across the larger Army Research and Development (R&D) community: with the Corps of Engineers' Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC), Army Research Institute (ARI), Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Sacked At Saipan Createspace Independent Publishing Platform  
ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP

3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

**Operations (ADP 3-0)** DIANE Publishing

"Is there commonality in how insurgent and counterinsurgent forces develop combat power? Elements of Combat Power remain an essential element of operational doctrine through the USADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. If Elements of Combat Power are essential to a military force, then it may be that they are equally important to insurgent forces. Case studies from the insurgency in Dhoafar and Post-911 Afghanistan are used to conduct an analysis to determine if insurgent forces develop combat power in a similar manner as the U.S. Army. The analysis demonstrates that insurgents generate combat power in ways that do not violate the principles outlined in USADRP 3-0. The analysis also demonstrates that counterinsurgent forces may conduct a Center of Gravity Analysis using the insurgent military force as the CoG and the Elements of Combat Power as the Critical Capabilities."--Abstract.

Normandy 1944 Princeton University Press

This study examines the relationship of current U.S. Field Artillery Doctrine to the concept of maneuver warfare. The impetus for the work is the generally poor results of fire support at the National Training Center (NTC). The purpose is to determine what, if anything, is wrong with FA doctrine. The analysis begins with an examination of the Relative Combat Power Model which relates the combat elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. This model is the backdrop for the remainder of the study which looks at the Army's experience at the NTC, the Arab-Israeli wars of the last twenty years, and evolving artillery doctrine. The study concludes that the maneuver and fire support communities are at odds over the adequacy of artillery doctrine due to shared misconception of the relationship between maneuver, firepower, and protection. Each fails to recognize that the elements of combat power are, at times, at odds with each other. This relationship requires that the leader synchronize all warfighting assets in a combined arms approach. Until all parties accept this notion, the Army runs the risk of basing doctrinal changes on a faulty premise. Keywords: Combat support; Fire support; Military maneuvers; Firepower. (EDC).

Speed and Power Lulu.com

Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war--striking, screening, scouting, and basing--and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the

armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges.

**Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation Volume IIA** Casemate

In war, do mass and materiel matter most? Will states with the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries invariably win? The prevailing answer today among both scholars and policymakers is yes. But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences

for both policy and scholarship. In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. *Military Power* will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.

*Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields* NOVA Publications (VA) Volume 5, *Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations*, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

**Military Power** Elsevier

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily

declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)

**Combat Power Analysis Is Combat Power Density** Vigeo Press

The author identifies a need to take a hard look at the analytical methods now used in the Army relating to force structuring, doctrine development, materiel development and tactical analysis. He shows that decisions in the above area depend upon an understanding of the key concept "combat power" and the combat power development process. He contends that much of current analytical methodology, including computer assisted simulations and mathematical ORSA techniques, does not adequately deal with the phenomenon of land combat. Many of the key variables on the battlefield are unquantifiable and thus mathematical models run the risk of biasing results in favor of the purely mechanical aspects of warfare. The author develops an analytical framework for understanding combat power and the process of generating it to win battles which borrows methodology from the social sciences. It relates all army functions and describes how these relate to the development of combat power. It allows the decision maker to recognize the variables he can control in a given situation and the trade offs available to

him. This analytical framework has applicability for the teaching of tactics and operations; the evaluation of unit readiness; the development of force structures; the identification of materiel and resource needs; and the development of doctrines and future concepts.

**Maneuver and Firepower** Courier Corporation

Based on the construction of detailed combat narratives and the application of current U.S. Army leadership doctrine as the assessment methodology, this study conducts a leadership analysis of three Distinguished Service Cross-winning battalion commanders of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The performances of LTC Benjamin Vandervoort at St. Mere-Eglise on 6-7 June 1944, of LTC James H. Lynch at Hill 314 in Korea on 12 September 1950, and of LTC Harold Moore at LZ X-Ray in Vietnam on 14-16 November 1965 are examined in terms of the tasks, the skills, knowledge, and attitudes, and the leadership performance indicators which support the nine leadership competencies of FM 22- 100, Military Leadership. This study concludes that the leadership competencies and their supporting SKA and LPI constitute a valid assessment tool for analyzing the combat performance on past -- and future -- battalion commanders. But on the whole, more of the warfighting focus of AirLand Battle doctrine should be incorporated into the performance standards in order to make the competencies more useful as a leadership evaluation tool for use at field training exercises or rotations at the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center.

**Network-centric Operations Case Study** Pickle Partners Publishing  
Dr. Donald J. Mrozeks research sheds

considerable light on how the use of air power evolved in the Vietnam War. Much more than simply retelling events, Mrozek analyzes how history, politics, technology, and the complexity of the war drove the application of air power in a long and divisive struggle. Mrozek delves into a wealth of original documentation, and his scholarship is impeccable. His analysis is thorough and balanced. His conclusions are well reasoned but will trouble those who have never seriously considered how the application of air power is influenced by factors far beyond the battlefield.

Whether or not the reader agrees with Mrozek, the quality of his research and analysis makes his conclusions impossible to ignore. John C. Fryer, Jr. Brigadier General, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

**Battalion Command in Combat, Forward Edge of Combat Power: A Leadership Analysis of Selected Battalion Commanders in Combat in World War II, Korea and Vietnam with Implication for Future Combat Leaders** Lulu.com

A revised and updated single-source reference book accurately detailing the German field forces employed in Normandy in 1944 and their losses. In this book, military historian Dr. Niklas Zetterling provides a sobering analysis of the subject matter and debunks a number of popular myths concerning the Normandy campaign—the effectiveness of Allied air power; the preferential treatment of Waffen-SS formations in comparison to their army counterparts; etc. He supports his text with exhaustive footnoting and provides an organizational chart for most of the formations covered in the book. Also included are numerous organizational

diagrams, charts, tables, and graphs. “A valuable reference for anyone seriously interested in the battle for Normandy.”

—The NYMAS Review

*The U. S. Military's Force Structure: A Primer* Lulu.com

The US Army's current operational doctrine, AirLand Battle, puts new emphasis on the corps as a battle fighting unit and on the corps commander as a leader who plans and fights decisive battles. This study examines how the corps commander generates and applies combat power in the conduct of operations to win battles. The focus of the study is on how the corps commander develops the combat power potential available to him to create combat power effect. The methodology for studying the problem is a historical analysis of how General Walton H. Walker, Commander, XX Corps, generated and applied combat power in the European Theater during World War II. The three operations were selected because they were distinct in nature and tempo and presented the corps commander varying and unique problems in generating and applying combat power. A major interest of the study is the dynamic relationship between the tangible and intangible potentials of combat power. The study shows that the tangible factors of combat power are important, but often the intangible factors are more important. Among those intangibles are the commander's operation style, his vision of battle, and his tactical skill. They all influence how he develops the combat power potential available to him. In conclusion the study offers three perspectives that make the study of a World War II corps relevant today. Those perspectives are the nature and function of the corps and corps commander; the

similarity between General Walker's operation style and the AirLand Battle's operational concept; and the importance of the human factor in AirLand Battle's concept of power and in how General Walker developed combat power.

**Fighting the Fleet** Rand Corporation  
 "The authors of this report seek to understand how network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities are a source of combat power for the Army's Stryker brigade and to determine the extent to which the tenets of NCO are realized by the unit. Using a broad range of measures of effectiveness, the authors compared the performance of a Stryker brigade with that of a nondigitized light infantry brigade in certification exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and found that the Stryker brigade's superior networking capabilities, superior shared situational awareness, speed of command, and ability to control the speed of command vastly improved the brigade's performance in these exercises. Using NCO measures of effectiveness, this analysis sheds light on the NCO capabilities that made the Stryker brigade a more agile and effective combat force. The authors conclude by discussing the potential implications of future NCO capabilities for future Army forces."--BOOK JACKET.  
*Understanding and Developing Combat Power* Pickle Partners Publishing  
 A politico-military assessment of the Vietnam War analyzing the U.S. Army's strategic and tactical ideologies. Particularly relevant today, it stresses the futility of any military action without the full support of the people.

**Warfighting** Rand Corporation  
 The monograph first discusses the elements of combat power and how they relate to enhance its development. Next,

two battles from North Africa, the Crusader Battle, November-December 1941, and the Battle of Gazala, May-June 1942, are analyzed using the elements combat power. Following this historical analysis, changes which have occurred within each element since Gazala are discussed before applicable lessons are related to current armored/motorized formations. The current organization and operating principles of the 9th Infantry Division (ID) are discussed next as an example of contemporary armored/motorized formations. Each element of combat power is compared with current operating principles, theory and history, as well as battlefield changes, to provide considerations for developing combat power by armored/motorized formations. Finally, implications and future missions for the 9th ID are discussed. The paper concludes that while there are applicable lessons from the WWII battles analyzed, they all cannot be transferred directly to current battlefield situations. What is clear, as with both the Axis and Allies, is the need to combine all the elements to develop combat power fully. Finally, while this paper does not fully address all the issues, armored/motorized formations can provide a mobile and relatively heavy antiarmor threat with a relatively small investment of strategic lift. Keywords: North Africa; Battles; Armor; Combat power. (cp).  
*American Strategy in Vietnam* Lulu.com  
 Based on the construction of detailed combat narratives and the application of current U.S. Army leadership doctrine as the assessment methodology, this study conducts a leadership analysis of three Distinguished Service Cross-winning battalion commanders of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The performances of LTC Benjamin Vandervoort at St.

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*Union And Confederate Infantry Doctrine In The Battle Of Chickamauga*  
Createspace Independent Pub

This report discusses the buildup of combat power during Operation Desert Shield based upon the analysis of results of an intensive data collection effort undertaken at the request of the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. This evaluation and data collection activity was initiated and completed while the deployment of forces was under way. This report describes an integrated view of this complex operation as examined by teams of researchers specializing in

policy, deployment, operations, command and control, logistics, and manpower and personnel. It focuses on the successes and problems encountered in this unprecedented operation and concludes with a discussion of the implications for future contingency operations.

*Electronic Warfare* Government Printing Office

"This major new book, by the author of the classic ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY, is a sustained and rigorously argued attempt to put forward a general theory of military combat, one which will be valid across history and potent in its implications for strategies and tactics in military policy. It is, in essence, an application of the scientific method to the behavioral patterns of military action. The book achieves its special strength from the rigor of quantified analysis combined with a wealth of detail drawn from actual military history. A major conclusion of the book is that American military planners and commanders need to draw upon historical experience in constructing a science of military combat, a science which is more essential than ever in an era of high military technology. Much like IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE, Col. Dupuy's UNDERSTANDING WAR gives an account of why American military ventures have frequently failed; but more important, it points the way toward successfully learning from historical experience."--BOOK JACKET.